




# IRATEMONK

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) IRATEMONK provides software application persistence on desktop and laptop computers by implanting the hard drive firmware to gain execution through Master Boot Record (MBR) substitution.

06/20/08



(TS//SI//REL) IRATEMONK Extended Concept of Operations

(TS//SI//REL) This technique supports systems without RAID hardware that boot from a variety of Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor, and Samsung hard drives. The supported file systems are: FAT, NTFS, EXT3 and UFS.

(TS//SI//REL) Through remote access or interdiction, UNITEDRAKE, or STRAITBAZZARE are used in conjunction with SLICKERVICAR to upload the hard drive firmware onto the target machine to implant IRATEMONK and its payload (the implant installer). Once implanted, IRATEMONK's frequency of execution (dropping the payload) is configurable and will occur when the target machine powers on.

**Status:** Released / Deployed. Ready for Immediate Delivery

**Unit Cost:** \$0

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32221, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# SWAP

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) SWAP provides software application persistence by exploiting the motherboard BIOS and the hard drive's Host Protected Area to gain periodic execution before the Operating System loads.

06/20/08



(TS//SI//REL) SWAP Extended Concept of Operations

(TS//SI//REL) This technique supports single or multi-processor systems running Windows, Linux, FreeBSD, or Solaris with the following file systems: FAT32, NTFS, EXT2, EXT3, or UFS 1.0.

(TS//SI//REL) Through remote access or interdiction, ARKSTREAM is used to re-flash the BIOS and TWISTEDKILT to write the Host Protected Area on the hard drive on a target machine in order to implant SWAP and its payload (the implant installer). Once implanted, SWAP's frequency of execution (dropping the payload) is configurable and will occur when the target machine powers on.

**Status:** Released / Deployed. Ready for Immediate Delivery

**Unit Cost:** \$0

**POC:** [REDACTED] S32221, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



# SOMBERKNAVE

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) SOMBERKNAVE is Windows XP wireless software implant that provides covert internet connectivity for isolated targets.

08/05/08

(TS//SI//REL) SOMBERKNAVE is a software implant that surreptitiously routes TCP traffic from a designated process to a secondary network via an unused embedded 802.11 network device. If an Internet-connected wireless Access Point is present, SOMBERKNAVE can be used to allow OLYMPUS or VALIDATOR to "call home" via 802.11 from an air-gapped target computer. If the 802.11 interface is in use by the target, SOMBERKNAVE will not attempt to transmit.

(TS//SI//REL) Operationally, VALIDATOR initiates a call home. SOMBERKNAVE triggers from the named event and tries to associate with an access point. If connection is successful, data is sent over 802.11 to the ROC. VALIDATOR receives instructions, downloads OLYMPUS, then disassociates and gives up control of the 802.11 hardware. OLYMPUS will then be able to communicate with the ROC via SOMBERKNAVE, as long as there is an available access point.



Status: Available – Fall 2008

Unit Cost: \$50k

POC: [redacted], S3223, [redacted], [redacted]@nsa.ic.gov  
ALT POC: [redacted], S3223, [redacted], [redacted]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108






# HEADWATER

## ANT Product Data

06/24/08

(TS//SI//REL) HEADWATER is a Persistent Backdoor (PBD) software implant for selected Huawei routers. The implant will enable covert functions to be remotely executed within the router via an Internet connection.



(TS//SI//REL) HEADWATER Persistence Implant Concept of Operations



(TS//SI//REL) HEADWATER PBD implant will be transferred remotely over the Internet to the selected target router by Remote Operations Center (ROC) personnel. After the transfer process is complete, the PBD will be installed in the router's boot ROM via an upgrade command. The PBD will then be activated after a system reboot. Once activated, the ROC operators will be able to use DNT's HAMMERMILL Insertion Tool (HIT) to control the PBD as it captures and examines all IP packets passing through the host router.

(TS//SI//REL) HEADWATER is the cover term for the PBD for Huawei Technologies routers. PBD has been adopted for use in the joint NSA/CIA effort to exploit Huawei network equipment. (The cover name for this joint project is TURBOPANDA.)

**Status:** (U//FOUO) On the shelf ready for deployment.

**POC:** [redacted], S32222, [redacted], [redacted]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# SCHOOLMONTANA

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) SCHOOLMONTANA provides persistence for DNT implants. The DNT implant will survive an upgrade or replacement of the operating system – including physically replacing the router's compact flash card.

06/24/08



(S//SI//REL) SCHOOLMONTANA Concept of Operations

(TS//SI//REL) Currently, the intended DNT Implant to persist is VALIDATOR, which must be run as a user process on the target operating system. The vector of attack is the modification of the target's BIOS. The modification will add the necessary software to the BIOS and modify its software to execute the SCHOOLMONTANA implant at the end of its native System Management Mode (SMM) handler.

(TS//SI//REL) SCHOOLMONTANA must support all modern versions of JUNOS, which is a version of FreeBSD customized by Juniper. Upon system boot, the JUNOS operating system is modified in memory to run the implant, and provide persistent kernel modifications to support implant execution.

(TS//SI//REL) SCHOOLMONTANA is the cover term for the persistence technique to deploy a DNT implant to Juniper J-Series routers.

**Status:** (U//FOUO) SCHOOLMONTANA completed and released by ANT May 30, 2008. It is ready for deployment.

**POC:** [redacted], S32222, [redacted], [redacted]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# JETFLOW

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) JETFLOW is a firmware persistence implant for Cisco PIX Series and ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) firewalls. It persists DNT's BANANAGLEE software implant. JETFLOW also has a persistent back-door capability.

06/24/08



(TS//SI//REL) JETFLOW Persistence Implant Concept of Operations

(TS//SI//REL) JETFLOW is a firmware persistence implant for Cisco PIX Series and ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) firewalls. It persists DNT's BANANAGLEE software implant and modifies the Cisco firewall's operating system (OS) at boot time. If BANANAGLEE support is not available for the booting operating system, it can install a Persistent Backdoor (PBD) designed to work with BANANAGLEE's communications structure, so that full access can be reacquired at a later time. JETFLOW works on Cisco's 500-series PIX firewalls, as well as most ASA firewalls (5505, 5510, 5520, 5540, 5550).

(TS//SI//REL) A typical JETFLOW deployment on a target firewall with an exfiltration path to the Remote Operations Center (ROC) is shown above. JETFLOW is remotely upgradeable and is also remotely installable provided BANANAGLEE is already on the firewall of interest.

**Status:** (C//REL) Released. Has been widely deployed. Current availability restricted based on OS version (inquire for details).

**Unit Cost:** \$0

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32222, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# HALLUXWATER

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) The HALLUXWATER Persistence Back Door implant is installed on a target Huawei Eudemon firewall as a boot ROM upgrade. When the target reboots, the PBD installer software will find the needed patch points and install the back door in the inbound packet processing routine.

06/24/08



(TS//SI//REL) HALLUXWATER Persistence Implant Concept of Operations

(TS//SI//REL) Once installed, HALLUXWATER communicates with an NSA operator via the TURBOPANDA Insertion Tool (PIT), giving the operator covert access to read and write memory, execute an address, or execute a packet.

(TS//SI//REL) HALLUXWATER provides a persistence capability on the Eudemon 200, 500, and 1000 series firewalls. The HALLUXWATER back door survives OS upgrades and automatic bootROM upgrades.

Status: (U//FOUO) On the shelf, and has been deployed.

POC: [redacted], S32222, [redacted], [redacted]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# FEEDTROUGH

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) FEEDTROUGH is a persistence technique for two software implants, DNT's BANANAGLEE and CES's ZESTYLEAK used against Juniper Netscreen firewalls.

06/24/08



(S//SI//REL) Persistence Operational Scenario

(TS//SI//REL) FEEDTROUGH can be used to persist two implants, ZESTYLEAK and/or BANANAGLEE across reboots and software upgrades on known and covered OS's for the following Netscreen firewalls, ns5xt, ns25, ns50, ns200, ns500 and ISG 1000. There is no direct communication to or from FEEDTROUGH, but if present, the BANANAGLEE implant can receive and transmit covert channel comms, and for certain platforms, BANANAGLEE can also update FEEDTROUGH. FEEDTROUGH however can only persist OS's included in it's databases. Therefore this is best employed with known OS's and if a new OS comes out, then the customer would need to add this OS to the FEEDTROUGH database for that particular firewall.

(TS//SI//REL) FEEDTROUGH operates every time the particular Juniper firewall boots. The first hook takes it to the code which checks to see if the OS is in the database, if it is, then a chain of events ensures the installation of either one or both implants. Otherwise the firewall boots normally. If the OS is one modified by DNT, it is not recognized, which gives the customer freedom to field new software.

**Status:** (S//SI//REL) FEEDTROUGH has on the shelf solutions for all of the listed platforms. It has been deployed on many target platforms

POC: [REDACTED], S32222, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108








# DEITYBOUNCE

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) DEITYBOUNCE provides software application persistence on Dell PowerEdge servers by exploiting the motherboard BIOS and utilizing System Management Mode (SMM) to gain periodic execution while the Operating System loads.

06/20/08



(TS//SI//REL) DEITYBOUNCE Extended Concept of Operations

(TS//SI//REL) This technique supports multi-processor systems with RAID hardware and Microsoft Windows 2000, 2003, and XP. It currently targets Dell PowerEdge 1850/2850/1950/2950 RAID servers, using BIOS versions A02, A05, A06, 1.1.0, 1.2.0, or 1.3.7.

(TS//SI//REL) Through remote access or interdiction, ARKSTREAM is used to re-flash the BIOS on a target machine to implant DEITYBOUNCE and its payload (the implant installer). Implantation via interdiction may be accomplished by non-technical operator through use of a USB thumb drive. Once implanted, DEITYBOUNCE's frequency of execution (dropping the payload) is configurable and will occur when the target machine powers on.

**Status:** Released / Deployed. Ready for Immediate Delivery

**Unit Cost:** \$0

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32221, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



# GODSURGE

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) GODSURGE runs on the FLUXBABBITT hardware implant and provides software application persistence on Dell PowerEdge servers by exploiting the JTAG debugging interface of the server's processors.

06/20/08



(TS//SI//REL) FLUXBABBITT Hardware Implant for PowerEdge 1950



(TS//SI//REL) FLUXBABBITT Hardware Implant for PowerEdge 2950



(TS//SI//REL) This technique supports Dell PowerEdge 1950 and 2950 servers that use the Xeon 5100 and 5300 processor families.

(TS//SI//REL) Through interdiction, the JTAG scan chain must be reconnected on the target system by removing the motherboard from the chassis and attaching the depopulated parts back onto the circuit board. After this step is complete, the hardware implant itself must be attached to the motherboard. The implants should already be programmed with the GODSURGE application code and its payload, the implant installer. Once implanted, GODSURGE's frequency of execution (dropping the payload) is configurable and will occur when the target machine powers on.

**Status:** Released / Deployed. Ready for Immediate Delivery

**Unit Cost:** \$500 for Hardware and Installation

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32221, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# IRONCHEF

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) IRONCHEF provides access persistence to target systems by exploiting the motherboard BIOS and utilizing System Management Mode (SMM) to communicate with a hardware implant that provides two-way RF communication.

07/14/08



(TS//SI//REL) IRONCHEF Extended Concept of Operations

(TS//SI//REL) This technique supports the HP Proliant 380DL G5 server, onto which a hardware implant has been installed that communicates over the I<sup>2</sup>C Interface (WAGONBED).

(TS//SI//REL) Through interdiction, IRONCHEF, a software CNE implant and the hardware implant are installed onto the system. If the software CNE implant is removed from the target machine, IRONCHEF is used to access the machine, determine the reason for removal of the software, and then reinstall the software from a listening post to the target system.

**Status:** Ready for Immediate Delivery

**Unit Cost:** \$0

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32221, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



# NIGHTSTAND

## Wireless Exploitation / Injection Tool

(TS//SI//REL) An active 802.11 wireless exploitation and injection tool for payload/exploit delivery into otherwise denied target space. NIGHTSTAND is typically used in operations where wired access to the target is not possible.

07/25/08

(TS//SI//REL) **NIGHTSTAND** - Close Access Operations • Battlefield Tested • Windows Exploitation • Standalone System

### System Details

- (U//FOUO) Standalone tool currently running on an x86 laptop loaded with Linux Fedora Core 3.
- (TS//SI//REL) Exploitable Targets include Win2k, WinXP, WinXPSP1, WINXPSP2 running internet Explorer versions 5.0-6.0.
- (TS//SI//REL) NS packet injection can target one client or multiple targets on a wireless network.
- (TS//SI//REL) Attack is undetectable by the user.



**NIGHTSTAND Hardware**

(TS//SI//REL) Use of external amplifiers and antennas in both experimental and operational scenarios have resulted in successful NIGHTSTAND attacks from as far away as eight miles under ideal environmental conditions.



**Unit Cost:** Varies from platform to platform

**Status:** Product has been deployed in the field. Upgrades to the system continue to be developed.

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32242, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# COTTONMOUTH-I

## ANT Product Data

**(TS//SI//REL)** COTTONMOUTH-I (CM-I) is a Universal Serial Bus (USB) hardware implant which will provide a wireless bridge into a target network as well as the ability to load exploit software onto target PCs.


08/05/08



**(TS//SI//REL)** CM-I will provide air-gap bridging, software persistence capability, "in-field" re-programmability, and covert communications with a host software implant over the USB. The RF link will enable command and data infiltration and exfiltration. CM-I will also communicate with Data Network Technologies (DNT) software (STRAITBIZARRE) through a covert channel implemented on the USB, using this communication channel to pass commands and data between hardware and software implants. CM-I will be a GENIE-compliant implant based on CHIMNEYPOOL.

**(TS//SI//REL)** CM-I conceals digital components (TRINITY), USB 1.1 FS hub, switches, and HOWLERMONKEY (HM) RF Transceiver within the USB Series-A cable connector. MOCCASIN is the version permanently connected to a USB keyboard. Another version can be made with an unmodified USB connector at the other end. CM-I has the ability to communicate to other CM devices over the RF link using an over-the-air protocol called SPECULATION.

**COTTONMOUTH CONOP**  
**INTERNET Scenario**



**Status:** Availability – January 2009

**Unit Cost:** 50 units: \$1,015K

**POC:** [REDACTED], S3223, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov  
**ALT POC:** [REDACTED], S3223, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# COTTONMOUTH-III

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) COTTONMOUTH-I (CM-I) is a Universal Serial Bus (USB) hardware implant, which will provide a wireless bridge into a target network as well as the ability to load exploit software onto target PCs.

08/05/08




(TS//SI//REL) CM-III will provide air-gap bridging, software persistence capability, "in-field" re-programmability, and covert communications with a host software implant over the USB. The RF link will enable command and data infiltration and exfiltration. CM-III will also communicate with Data Network Technologies (DNT) software (STRAITBIZARRE) through a covert channel implemented on the USB, using this communication channel to pass commands and data between hardware and software implants. CM-III will be a GENIE-compliant implant based on CHIMNEYPOOL.

(TS//SI//REL) CM-III conceals digital components (TRINITY), a USB 2.0 HS hub, switches, and HOWLERMONKEY (HM) RF Transceiver within a RJ45 Dual Stacked USB connector. CM-I has the ability to communicate to other CM devices over the RF link using an over-the-air protocol called SPECULATION. CM-III can provide a short range inter-chassis link to other CM devices or an intra-chassis RF link to a long haul relay subsystem.



COTTONMOUTH CONOP  
INTERNET Scenario



Status: Availability – May 2009

Unit Cost: 50 units: \$1,248K

POC: [REDACTED], S3223, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20070108

ALT POC: [REDACTED], S3223, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Declassify On: 20320108




# FIREWALK


## ANT Product Data

08/05/08

(TS//SI//REL) FIREWALK is a bidirectional network implant, capable of passively collecting Gigabit Ethernet network traffic, and actively injecting Ethernet packets onto the same target network.



(TS//SI//REL) FIREWALK is a bi-directional 10/100/1000bT (Gigabit) Ethernet network implant residing within a dual stacked RJ45 / USB connector. FIREWALK is capable of filtering and egressing network traffic over a custom RF link and injecting traffic as commanded; this allows an ethernet tunnel (VPN) to be created between target network and the ROC (or an intermediate redirector node such as DNT's DANDERSPRITZ tool.) FIREWALK allows active exploitation of a target network with a firewall or air gap protection. (TS//SI//REL) FIREWALK uses the HOWLERMONKEY transceiver for back-end communications. It can communicate with an LP or other compatible HOWLERMONKEY based ANT products to increase RF range through multiple hops.



Status: Prototype Available – August 2008

Unit Cost: 50 Units \$537K

POC: [REDACTED], S3223, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov  
 ALT POC: [REDACTED], S3223, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
 Dated: 20070108  
 Declassify On: 20320108



# RAGEMASTER

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) RF retro-reflector that provides an enhanced radar cross-section for VAGRANT collection. It's concealed in a standard computer video graphics array (VGA) cable between the video card and video monitor. It's typically installed in the ferrite on the video cable.

24 Jul 2008

### (U) Capabilities

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) RAGEMASTER provides a target for RF flooding and allows for easier collection of the VAGRANT video signal. The current RAGEMASTER unit taps the red video line on the VGA cable. It was found that, empirically, this provides the best video return and cleanest readout of the monitor contents.



### (U) Concept of Operation

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The RAGEMASTER taps the red video line between the video card within the desktop unit and the computer monitor, typically an LCD. When the RAGEMASTER is illuminated by a radar unit, the illuminating signal is modulated with the red video information. This information is re-radiated, where it is picked up at the radar, demodulated, and passed onto the processing unit, such as a LFS-2 and an external monitor, NIGHTWATCH, GOTHAM, or (in the future) VIEWPLATE. The processor recreates the horizontal and vertical sync of the targeted monitor, thus allowing TAO personnel to see what is displayed on the targeted monitor.

**Unit Cost:** \$ 30

**Status:** Operational. Manufactured on an as-needed basis. Contact POC for availability information.

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32243, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov



Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108





# SURLYSPAWN


## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) Data RF retro-reflector. Provides return modulated with target data (keyboard, low data rate digital device) when illuminated with radar.

07 Apr 2009

### (U) Capabilities

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) SURLYSPAWN has the capability to gather keystrokes without requiring any software running on the targeted system. It also only requires that the targeted system be touched once. The retro-reflector is compatible with both USB and PS/2 keyboards. The simplicity of the design allows the form factor to be tailored for specific operational requirements. Future capabilities will include laptop keyboards.



### (U) Concept of Operation

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The board taps into the data line from the keyboard to the processor. The board generates a square wave oscillating at a preset frequency. The data-line signal is used to shift the square wave frequency higher or lower, depending on the level of the data-line signal. The square wave, in essence, becomes frequency shift keyed (FSK). When the unit is illuminated by a CW signal from a nearby radar, the illuminating signal is amplitude-modulated (AM) with this square wave. The signal is re-radiated, where it is received by the radar, demodulated, and the demodulated signal is processed to recover the keystrokes. SURLYSPAWN is part of the ANGRYNEIGHBOR family of radar retro-reflectors.

**Unit Cost:** \$30

**Status:** End processing still in development

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32243, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



# CTX4000

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The CTX4000 is a portable continuous wave (CW) radar unit. It can be used to illuminate a target system to recover different off net information. Primary uses include VAGRANT and DROPMIRE collection.

8 Jul 2008



(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The CTX4000 provides the means to collect signals that otherwise would not be collectable, or would be extremely difficult to collect and process. It provides the following features:

- Frequency Range: 1 - 2 GHz.
- Bandwidth: Up to 45 MHz
- Output Power: User adjustable up to 2 W using the internal amplifier; external amplifiers make it possible to go up to 1 kW.
- Phase adjustment with front panel knob
- User-selectable high- and low-pass filters.
- Remote controllable
- Outputs:
  - Transmit antenna
  - I & Q video outputs
  - DC bias for an external pre-amp on the Receive input connector
- Inputs:
  - External oscillator
  - Receive antenna

**Unit Cost:** N/A

**Status:** unit is operational. However, it is reaching the end of its service life. It is scheduled to be replaced by PHOTOANGLO starting in September 2008.

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32243, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov



Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



# LOUDAUTO


## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) Audio-based RF retro-reflector. Provides room audio from targeted space using radar and basic post-processing.

07 Apr 2009

### (U) Capabilities

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) LOUDAUTO's current design maximizes the gain of the microphone. This makes it extremely useful for picking up room audio. It can pick up speech at a standard, office volume from over 20' away. (NOTE: Concealments may reduce this distance.) It uses very little power (~15 uA at 3.0 VDC), so little, in fact, that battery self-discharge is more of an issue for serviceable lifetime than the power draw from this unit. The simplicity of the design allows the form factor to be tailored for specific operational requirements. All components are COTS and so are non-attributable to NSA.



### (U) Concept of Operation

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) Room audio is picked up by the microphone and converted into an analog electrical signal. This signal is used to pulse position modulate (PPM) a square wave signal running at a pre-set frequency. This square wave is used to turn a FET (field effect transistor) on and off. When the unit is illuminated with a CW signal from a nearby radar unit, the illuminating signal is amplitude-modulated with the PPM square wave. This signal is re-radiated, where it is picked up by the radar, then processed to recover the room audio. Processing is currently performed by COTS equipment with FM demodulation capability (Rohde & Schwarz FSH-series portable spectrum analyzers, etc.) LOUDAUTO is part of the ANGRYNEIGHBOR family of radar retro-reflectors.

**Unit Cost:** \$30

**Status:** End processing still in development

**POC:** [REDACTED], S32243, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108



# NIGHTWATCH

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) NIGHTWATCH is a portable computer with specialized, internal hardware designed to process progressive-scan (non-interlaced) VAGRANT signals.

24 Jul 2008

### (U) Capability Summary

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The current implementation of NIGHTWATCH consists of a general-purpose PC inside of a shielded case. The PC has PCI digitizing and clock cards to provide the needed interface and accurate clocking required for video reconstruction. It also has:

- horizontal sync, vertical sync and video outputs to drive an external, multi-sync monitor.
- video input
- spectral analysis up to 150 kHz to provide for indications of horizontal and vertical sync frequencies
- frame capture and forwarding
- PCMCIA cards for program and data storage
- horizontal sync locking to keep the display set on the NIGHTWATCH display.
- frame averaging up to  $2^{16}$  (65536) frames.



### (U) Concept of Operation

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The video output from an appropriate collection system, such as a CTX4000, PHOTOANGLO, or general-purpose receiver, is connected to the video input on the NIGHTWATCH system. The user, using the appropriate tools either within NIGHTWATCH or externally, determines the horizontal and vertical sync frequencies of the targeted monitor. Once the user matches the proper frequencies, he activates "Sync Lock" and frame averaging to reduce noise and improve readability of the targeted monitor. If warranted, the user then forwards the displayed frames over a network to NSAW, where analysts can look at them for intelligence purposes.

**Unit Cost:** N/A

**Status:** This system has reached the end of its service life. All work concerning the NIGHTWATCH system is strictly for maintenance purposes. This system is slated to be replaced by the VIEWPLATE system.

**POC:** [REDACTED] S32243, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# DROPOUTJEEP

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) DROPOUTJEEP is a STRAITBIZARRE based software implant for the Apple iPhone operating system and uses the CHIMNEYPOOL framework. DROPOUTJEEP is compliant with the FREEFLOW project, therefore it is supported in the TURBULENCE architecture.

10/01/08



(U//FOUO) DROPOUTJEEP – Operational Schematic

(TS//SI//REL) DROPOUTJEEP is a software implant for the Apple iPhone that utilizes modular mission applications to provide specific SIGINT functionality. This functionality includes the ability to remotely push/pull files from the device, SMS retrieval, contact list retrieval, voicemail, geolocation, hot mic, camera capture, cell tower location, etc. Command, control, and data exfiltration can occur over SMS messaging or a GPRS data connection. All communications with the implant will be covert and encrypted.

(TS//SI//REL) The initial release of DROPOUTJEEP will focus on installing the implant via close access methods. A remote installation capability will be pursued for a future release.

**Unit Cost:** \$ 0

**Status:** (U) In development

**POC:** U//FOUO [REDACTED], S32222, [REDACTED]@nsa.gov



Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# GOPHERSET

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) GOPHERSET is a software implant for GSM (Global System for Mobile communication) subscriber identify module (SIM) cards. This implant pulls Phonebook, SMS, and call log information from a target handset and exfiltrates it to a user-defined phone number via short message service (SMS).

10/01/08



(U//FOUO) GOPHERSET – Operational Schematic

(TS//SI//REL) Modern SIM cards (Phase 2+) have an application program interface known as the SIM Toolkit (STK). The STK has a suite of proactive commands that allow the SIM card to issue commands and make requests to the handset. GOPHERSET uses STK commands to retrieve the requested information and to exfiltrate data via SMS. After the GOPHERSET file is compiled, the program is loaded onto the SIM card using either a Universal Serial Bus (USB) smartcard reader or via over-the-air provisioning. In both cases, keys to the card may be required to install the application depending on the service provider's security configuration.



**Unit Cost:** \$0

**Status:** (U//FOUO) Released. Has not been deployed.

**POC:** U//FOUO [REDACTED], S32222, [REDACTED]@nsa.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# MONKEYCALENDAR

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) MONKEYCALENDAR is a software implant for GSM (Global System for Mobile communication) subscriber identify module (SIM) cards. This implant pulls geolocation information from a target handset and exfiltrates it to a user-defined phone number via short message service (SMS).

10/01/08



(U//FOUO) MONKEYCALENDAR - Operational Schematic

(TS//SI//REL) Modern SIM cards (Phase 2+) have an application program interface known as the SIM Toolkit (STK). The STK has a suite of proactive commands that allow the SIM card to issue commands and make requests to the handset. MONKEYCALENDAR uses STK commands to retrieve location information and to exfiltrate data via SMS. After the MONKEYCALENDAR file is compiled, the program is loaded onto the SIM card using either a Universal Serial Bus (USB) smartcard reader or via over-the-air provisioning. In both cases, keys to the card may be required to install the application depending on the service provider's security configuration

**Unit Cost:** \$0

**Status:** Released, not deployed.

**POC:** U//FOUO [redacted], S32222, [redacted]@nsa.gov



Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108




# TOTEGHOSTLY 2.0

## ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) TOTEGHOSTLY 2.0 is a STRAITBIZARRE based implant for the Windows Mobile embedded operating system and uses the CHIMNEYPOOL framework. TOTEGHOSTLY 2.0 is compliant with the FREEFLOW project, therefore it is supported in the TURBULENCE architecture.

10/01/08



(U//FOUO) TOTEGHOSTLY - Data Flow Schematic

(TS//SI//REL) TOTEGHOSTLY 2.0 is a software implant for the Windows Mobile operating system that utilizes modular mission applications to provide specific SIGINT functionality. This functionality includes the ability to remotely push/pull files from the device, SMS retrieval, contact list retrieval, voicemail, geolocation, hot mic, camera capture, cell tower location, etc. Command, control, and data exfiltration can occur over SMS messaging or a GPRS data connection. A FRIEZERAMP interface using HTTPslink2 transport module handles encrypted communications.

(TS//SI//REL) The initial release of TOTEGHOSTLY 2.0 will focus on installing the implant via close access methods. A remote installation capability will be pursued for a future release.

(TS//SI//REL) TOTEGHOSTLY 2.0 will be controlled using an interface tasked through the NCC (Network Control Center) utilizing the XML based tasking and data forward scheme under the TURBULENCE architecture following the TAO GENIE Initiative.

**Unit Cost:** \$0

**Status:** (U) In development

**POC:** U//FOUO [redacted], S3222, [redacted]@nsa.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108






# TYPHON HX

## GSM Base Station Router

(S//SI//FVEY) Base Station Router - Network-In-a-Box (NIB) supporting GSM bands 850/900/1800/1900 and associated full GSM signaling and call control.


06/20/08



(S//SI//FVEY) Tactical SIGINT elements use this equipment to find, fix and finish targeted handset users.

(S//SI) Target GSM handset registers with BSR unit.

(S//SI) Operators are able to geolocate registered handsets, capturing the user.



(S//SI//REL) The macro-class Typhon is a Network-In-a-Box (NIB), which includes all the necessary architecture to support Mobile Station call processing and SMS messaging in a stand-alone chassis with a pre-provisioning capability.

(S//SI//REL) The Typhon system kit includes the amplified Typhon system, OAM&P Laptop, cables, antennas and AC/DC power supply.

(U//FOUO) An 800 WH Lilon Battery kit is offered separately.

(U) A bracket and mounting kit are available upon request.

Typhon Hx Priced Options		
Deliverable	Duration	FFP COST ea.
1 to 25 units	4 Months	\$175,800
Typhon Model/Color	Order Code (& Tool Spare kit)	
Hx3/Black (GSM850)	G1004164 & G1004140	
Hx3/Green (GSM850)	G1004161 & G1004137	
Hx9/Black (EGSM900)	G1003727 & G1002665	
Hx9/Green (EGSM900)	G1003726 & G1002037	
Hx18/Black (DCS1800)	G1004165 & G1004141	
Hx18/Green (DCS1800)	G1004162 & G1004138	
Hx19/Black (PCS1900)	G1004166 & G1004142	
Hx19/Green (PCS1900)	G1004163 & G1004139	

(U) Status: Available 4 mos ARO

(S//SI//REL) Operational Restrictions exist for equipment deployment.

POC: [REDACTED] S32242, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
 Dated: 20070108  
 Declassify On: 20320108